

This article was downloaded by: [Desmond Odugu]

On: 27 July 2015, At: 08:57

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG



International Multilingual Research Journal

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hmrj20>

Antinomies of Ideologies and Situationality of Education Language Politics in Multilingual Contexts

Desmond Ikenna Odugu^a

^a Department of Education, Lake Forest College

Accepted author version posted online: 13 May 2015.



CrossMark

[Click for updates](#)

To cite this article: Desmond Ikenna Odugu (2015) Antinomies of Ideologies and Situationality of Education Language Politics in Multilingual Contexts, International Multilingual Research Journal, 9:3, 137-158, DOI: [10.1080/19313152.2015.1047703](https://doi.org/10.1080/19313152.2015.1047703)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19313152.2015.1047703>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &

Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

Antinomies of Ideologies and Situationality of Education Language Politics in Multilingual Contexts

Desmond Ikenna Odugu

*Department of Education
Lake Forest College*

Widespread scholarly and political attention to language-related inequities in the 20th century precipitated a spate of orientations to language planning in multilingual societies. While various orientations indicate a shift from earlier deficit to affirmative views of multilingualism, vigorous debates persist about the logical and pragmatic merits of each orientation. The resulting advocacy for language and multilingualism has yet to result in widespread mother-language-based multilingual education policies and practices. This article reviews a strand of these debates (language as right or resource) and argues that these debates deploy stringent criteria of rationality and social justice that are discontinuous with empirical realities of multilingualism and plurilingualism. It uses ethnographic evidence from India and Nigeria to demonstrate that, instead of the fixities of such criteria, actual language decision making in complex multilingual societies demands an integrative approach to theory, policy, and practice that is dialogic, tentative, and promotive of all possible languages.

Keywords: education, India, language, language discrimination, multilingualism, Nigeria

The 20th century was momentous for language scholarship. Asymmetries in language relations received wider and intensified attention as a social justice concern with potent political and economic consequences. As evidenced in a 1968 conference organized by the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Sociolinguistics, "language problems of developing nations" became a central concern in an evolving international human rights movement (see Fishman, Charles, & Das Gupta, 1968; Neier, 2012). Moreover, international organizations, including the United Nations (UN) and United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), scripted language rights in their constitution and position papers (UNESCO, 1945, 1953, 2003; United Nations, 1948). The result was a spate of multidisciplinary typologies and orientations intended to guide language planning in multilingual contexts (see, e.g., corpus and status planning [Kloss, 1969]; shift from "language-as-problem" to "language-as-right" and/or "language-as-resource" [Kontra, Phillipson, Skutnabb-Kangas, & Várady, 1999; Ruiz, 1984]; linguistic ecology [Harmon, 1995, 1996; Maffi, 2005; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2002]; "top-down" statist/macro contra "bottom-up" micro language planning [Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007, Liddicoat & Baldauf, 2008; Nekvapil, 2008]; see also May, 2011; Ricento, 2006). The backdrop of these ideas include the devastations of the two world wars, enduring racial discrimination

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Desmond Ikenna Odugu, Lake Forest College, 555 N. Sheridan Road, Lake Forest, IL 60045. E-mail: odugu@lakeforest.edu

Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/hmrj.

and the rise of civil rights campaigns, legacies of colonialism and worldwide ascendancy of some European languages, anticolonial movements and emergence of new “nations,” and developments in scholarship, especially those that challenged earlier deficit views of language and multilingualism.

The emergence of each typology and/or orientation sparked heated debates over its logical and practical merits (see, e.g., Pennycook, 2006; Petrovic, 2005; Ricento, 2005; Ruiz, 2010; Stroud, 2001; Tollefson, 2006). The orientations and accompanying debates frame language planning as a purely *rational* process consistent with the enlightenment zeitgeist that defines rationality by logical order, coherence, and universality. Furthermore, they portray language discrimination as social injustice, thus making its sole remedy a corresponding social justice. This two-part article reviews these assumptions and argues that instead of stringently defined criteria of rationality and a narrow vision of social justice, functional chaos and strategic “injustice” are essential to understanding and resolving language-related discriminations in complex multilingual settings. It starts by examining some examples of the polemics over language planning ideologies to highlight the common assumptions about rationality underlying the competing perspectives. Next, it connects these to larger political philosophy debates, especially between communitarianism and libertarianism (and more recently, neoliberalism), which underlie expectations about the possibility of social justice. It then uses ethnographic evidence from India and Nigeria to show that actual realities of language practices in complex multilingual settings often abhor these fixities of rationality and social justice. To ensure that the terms of these increasingly ideology-laden debates and their discontinuities with empirical realities of language practices do not strangulate the discourse and/or reverse current marginal gains in mother-language-based multilingual education (MLB-MLE), the conclusion argues for integrative conceptualizations of language issues consistent with the situationality and complexities of actual language behaviors. To be effective, such integrative conceptualization must be dialogic and tentative and encourage (not merely permit) the widest range of language uses in the social context in which language and other forms of discrimination occur.

Before delving into these debates, a few caveats are useful for understanding the scope of this article. First, language tensions are perhaps as old as the interaction of human societies (see Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997). Indeed, the provenance of contemporary language planning arguably antedates earlier politics of empires of the Romans, Arabs, French, and so forth (see Ager, 1996; Calvet, 1998). However, this study focuses on 20th-century developments that define recent multilingualism discourse. Second, language issues in multilingual contexts are studied under various fields, including linguistics, sociolinguistics and applied linguistics, development studies, globalization, linguistic and psychological anthropology, education, political philosophy, etc. However, it is in education that its tensions and consequences are arguably most evident. Despite major theoretical advances and widening political activism, many multilingual societies (excepting Papua New Guinea and recently, the Philippines) continue to resist linguistic diversity in schooling contexts, adhering instead to policies grounded on normative monolingualism or transitional multilingualism (see Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Djité, 2008; Klaus, 2003). Normative monolingualism and transitional multilingualism take for granted a hierarchy of languages and the superiority of foreign, often colonial, languages (with languages construed in fixed and finite terms) and discriminate against nondominant languages. Third, it is impractical and unnecessary to exhaust theoretical debates over language planning here. Thus, I focus on the *resource* and *rights* orientations (Ruiz, 1984) to illustrate how polemics over conceptual adequacy

evinced a persistent quest for “rational” and “just” theory. As a response to earlier deficit thinking, the terms “language-as-resource” and “language-as-right” can be misleading; it is not language per se but multilingualism and “minoritized” languages that were construed as obstacles to cognitive, socioeconomic, and political developments (see Karam, 1974; Ruiz, 1984). Like others, the rights/resource formulation presents more serious problems (see Petrovic, 2005; Ricento, 2005; Wee, 2011). Yet this review is not intended to endorse any view but to illustrate how their underlying claims about rationality and social justice are discordant with the fluid nature and situationality of language practices in multilingual communicative contexts (see Kymlicka & Patten, 2003; Kymlicka, 1995; Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1995).

Methodologically, amalgamating philosophical and ethnographic analyses highlights two conceptually imbricated assumptions of this article. For one, to be practically meaningful, any discourse on language issues in multilingual societies must be grounded on the empirical realities they describe. Yet the varied and changing nature of language diversity makes a sufficiently comprehensive empirical study of language issues impracticable. Thus, all language policies are provisional.

PART I: ANTINOMIES OF ORIENTATIONS: CLAIMS OF RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Conceptualizing language as resource, not problem, arose from various multidisciplinary inquiries. Psycholinguistic and cognitive science research highlighted the cognitive and psychological benefits of multilingualism (Fafunwa, Macauley, & Sokoya, 1989; Jessner, 2008; Kroll & De Groot, 2005). Expert consensus, including on multicompetence, was strong that multilinguals possess enhanced cognitive processes and metalinguistic awareness different from monolinguals (Cook, 1992; MacSwan, 2000; Rodríguez-Fornells, Balaguer, & Münte, 2006). Following new directions in interdisciplinary scholarship, linguistic ecologists argue that linguistic diversity and biodiversity are mutually interdependent and that indigenous languages are necessary for transmitting technical aspects of traditional knowledge about various species critical to ecological sustainability (Harmon, 1995, 1996; Maffi, 2005; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2002).

The idea that language is a right protectable through transnational charters comes from various sources, including post-World War II antidiscrimination humanitarianism, campaigns for civil liberties around the world, legal processes especially in the United States, and the emergence of ethnic researchers (Ruiz, 1984). It has been stylized and vigorously defended for over three decades as “linguistic human rights” in opposition to linguistic imperialism and linguisticism.¹ Empirical studies of the pedagogical benefits of “mother-tongue” education echoed the legalistic language of this emergent international ethics by portraying “mother tongue education . . . as an inalienable right and its denial . . . as denial of the child’s fundamental human right” (Fafunwa et al., 1989, p. vii).² The scope of language rights entails both the negative “right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language” and the positive “right to use . . . language(s) in the activities of communal life” (Marcía, 1979, pp. 88–89). These rights are integrative because they encompass several aspects and layers of social and individual life such that “any comprehensive

¹See Phillipson (1992, 2006, 2013), Skutnabb-Kangas, Brutt-Griffler, Canagarajah, Pennycook, and Tollefson (2004), Canagarajah (1999), Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1995).

²For a critique of the “inalienability” term associated with language rights, see (2011).

statement about language rights cannot confine itself to merely linguistic considerations” (Ruiz, 1984, p. 22).

Critics of language-as-resource charged that despite its usefulness (see Johnson, 2013; Wiley, 2006), it was narrow and a politically misguided strategic mistake (Petrovic, 2005; Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1995). The flaw here arises from an antinomy in the nature of language and the idea of resource. While language is unquestionably a resource within cognitive and communicative contexts, resourcefulness is not an inherent character of any specific language necessarily and exclusively tied to its speakers; the idea of resource places no obligation on its beneficiary. To be fully effective, therefore, the resource logic requires a “necessity” claim that ties a specific language to its community.

To counteranalogize with the chemical basis of biological life, chemical elements in general are resourceful to biological life. Specifically, oxygen is not only a resource but a necessity for human life. To live, it is not optional for humans to substitute their oxygen needs with gold or rhodium, the preciousness of these elements notwithstanding. Nor can chlorophyllic plants opt to forgo their nitrogen nutrition. Unlike O₂ in human biological life, the resourcefulness of any language is not inherent but an imposed social construct. Language in general is a resource. But no specific language exclusively ties its users to the resourcefulness of language. As such, speakers of language A need not use A to access the resources available through language. To argue that A is inherently a resource to which speakers are exclusively and necessarily tied voids any need for deliberate action (i.e., choosing to use or not to use A). This is the domain of choice—and of policy and practice. Therein lies the antinomy of language resource: We cannot both argue that a specific language is necessarily and exclusively a resource and that people *choose* to use it. Conversely, to argue that no specific language is an exclusive resource (the only logical ground for deliberate action) exposes language resource to the economic, political, cultural, and ideological calculi of public policy. That is, nothing stops a minority language user from choosing a dominant language as the preferred resource.

This politico-economic pliability underlies the contention that the resource orientation foists language as a generic solution appealing to people from all ideological, political, and cultural persuasions (Petrovic, 2005). It promotes linguistic diversity through education and employment for language minorities but also serves military, political, and economic interests of dominant states (Ruiz, 1984; Thompson, 1973). By implicitly commodifying linguistic resources in asymmetrical global markets historically controlled by hegemony, the resource orientation endorses further exploitation of marginalized groups and enlists them as tools in their own subjugation (Petrovic, 2005). Ultimately, the resource orientation “may be complicit with unstated agendas of maintaining current social arrangements that favor policies not particularly favorable to linguistic diversity as intrinsically good or as national resource, where ‘national’ tends to exclude non-English language and cultures” (Ricento, 2005, p. 364).

Advocates of resource may shift focus from language to multilingualism, arguing that only within the context of a truly multilingual society can economic benefits be derived from language-as-resource (Ruiz, 2010, p. 160). But the antinomy persists; there is no intrinsic value attached to any specific set of languages or configuration of multilinguality, which is denied other sets. For a Kenyan to adopt English, French, and Spanish is no less multilingual than adopting Kiswahili, Gikuyu, and Kigiryama. Assuming a linguistic minority group as monolithic, it can adopt several foreign languages, abandon all indigenous languages, and still satisfy this multilingual condition. Thus, resource leaves the protection of minority languages/groups and of linguistic diversity to

chance, not to any secure conceptual strategy. Research evidence amply shows that minorities do not always act in ways that are protective of their languages, despite the economic values of such languages (Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Djité, 2008).

Although conceptualizing language and/or multilingualism as an inalienable right provides a more secure philosophical anchorage than the implied instrumentality of resource, it exposes rights to a deeper philosophical scrutiny. To be treated as other fundamental human rights, language rights must transcend cultural, ideological, and political contingencies. However, critics argue that while language rights raise awareness about linguisticism, the nature of language is too fluid for the rigidities of rights discourse (Sayers, 2011; Wee, 2011). For one, to argue that language rights are possessed by users and languages alike makes language both the bearer and object of rights. But this violates the principle of rights, which requires distinction of its bearer from its object (Wee, 2011, p. 21). Further, the effort to erect an individuated object of language rights essentializes language (Wee calls it “reinvention”) and hoists linguistic systems in finite legalistic terms that ignore the fluidity and variability of actual linguistic cultural practices (S. Makoni & Mashiri, 2007; Sayers, 2009). Language is not a fixed system but dynamic and emergent (Hooper, 1998; Pennycook, 2006). Rather than a fixed and fully developed content of an individual’s cognition applied in social behaviors, language is an emergent form of social practice comprised of “sociocultural habits that are enacted anew each time social actors come into contact with each other” (Wee, 2011, p. 12; see also Hooper, 1998; Pennycook, 2006; Ricento, 2006). Similarly, multilingualism is not merely a mosaic of finite languages with fixed boundaries but the plurilingual crisscrossing and emergent hybridization of linguistic practices in actual communicative contexts (Canagarajah & Ashraf, 2013).³

The empirical and jurisprudential problems of essentializing language apply to another antinomy of rights and to whether the bearers of language rights are individuals, groups, or both (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1995). If language rights accrue to the individual as inalienable properties, individuals can both transfer them across space, as immigrants do, and/or dispose of them as they see fit. This is similar to the sociological calculus of language-as-resource. If such rights accrue to individuals as group members, there are serious questions about setting group identity and membership (Wee, 2011). Like language, constructing groups appeals to erasure of differences, as internal heterogeneity and changes in intragroup characteristics are neutralized in the quest for a putative cohesive identity (Wee, 2011, p. 25).

Moreover, individuals cannot readily uphold or defend their rights *as individuals* without deteriorating into Hobbes’s primitive society where “might makes right” (see Hobbes, 1651/1904). Recourse to the state or other groups is equally problematic since minority language rights are mostly violated by the state or groups within. To expect linguistically entangled entities, (e.g., states or more-dominant groups), to adjudicate *fairly* on linguistic rights that accrue exclusively to individuals is problematic. Even democracy is ineffectual here, since its appeal is a defense of majority, not all individual interests. For instance, Patten’s (2003) prorated scheme of official multilingualism, which addresses this critique against liberal neutrality, takes account not only of equality among language groups but also “the number of people demanding services in each

³Since plurilingualism captures the individual-level use of multiple languages, some critics suggest that it also views languages as finite entities (S. B. Makoni, 2011, p. 683). Granting this claim, my use of the term here suggests that plurilingualism need not be defined as individualized multilingualism. Rather, it embodies the emergent and indeterminate character of communicative practices in multilingual settings (Canagarajah & Ashraf, 2013; B. Makoni & Makoni, 2010).

recognized language” (p. 372). Thus, language rights are still subject to nonlinguistic (e.g., demographic and fiscal) considerations. While “resource” leaves the protection of linguistic diversity and minoritized languages to chance, “rights” transfer that responsibility to its prime offender.

Now the preceding review offers one of many possible cases of a rhizomatous body of philosophical debates, whose stringent claims about rational logic reifies the discourse and potentially stagnates advances in language diversity. For instance, critics of linguistic ecology deploy the same logic of ecological conservation to argue that language extinction is a natural/unavoidable phenomena of social evolution (Ladefoged, 1992; see Dorian, 1993 for a response to Ladefoged). There is also ambiguity about the relationships of the various frames of reference: “orientations” (Ruiz, 1984), “approach” (Tollefson, 1991), “ideology” (see Ricento, 2000b; Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity, 1998), “typology” (Kloss, 1969), etc. Like language resource and rights, debates over these formulations represent reifications of complicated language decision making as purely rational processes of free-acting agents.

Ideological Context of Language Planning Debate

The real import of these debates is clearer when situated within sets of competing ideologies that underpin the assumptions about rationality and the possibility of social justice. The first, which concerns the normative outcomes of language affiliations/choices, pits *instrumentalism* against *constitutivism* (see De Schutter, 2007). Instrumentalists view language as a tool for nonlinguistic ends, while constitutivists approach language as an essential constituent of identity. Although relatively obscure, instrumentalism persists in neoliberal views of language shifts (see the following). Constitutivists’ defense of language rights is either *objectivist* or *subjectivist*. From the objectivist stance, language is an ontological constituent of identity, and all languages/language groups deserve protection. But this can lead to linguistic paternalism, allowing states or elites to dictate identities even against all resistance. For subjectivists, any language deserves protection if an individual or group demands it, regardless of whether or not they see language as essential to identity (see De Schutter, 2007). But this *carte blanche* is unsustainable, especially given the vagaries of individual/group interests. It also does not help language group members who make irreconcilable demands about a common language.

Another set of ideologies is the communitarianism contra libertarianism controversies of the 1980s. Although this “chicken-or-egg” debate about whether the individual or community constitutes the appropriate basis for public policy may have waned in scholarly circles, its echoes continue to reverberate in political and economic wranglings between left- and right-wing ideologues. The dilemma here is equally devastating: By arguing that the notion of a truly “free” atomistic individual is only a *factio mentis* and cannot help culturally embedded agents, communitarians purportedly endorse state tyranny. Conversely, libertarians must advocate anarchy to avoid the communitarian state, which is incapable of neutral action. Details of these debates are outlined in Hudson (2008) and Delaney (1994) and are unnecessary here. Suffice it to note that, while the communitarian defense of multilingualism is well known, the libertarian manifesto persists in neoliberal perspectives on language discrimination, especially since the reintroduction and transmorgrification of *laissez-faire* political economics in the 1980s.

One such neoliberal “theory” of language competition argues that (a) languages *freely* compete for functional value in the same social domain at the systemic level, just as states compete

for power, and firms for capital; (b) “*de facto* weaker languages have no other possibility than to retain functions in more stagnant, less socially valuable, less shared, and less function-intensive domains”; and thus (c) language discrimination and extinction is a neutral, perhaps positive, phenomenon (Donskoi, 2006, p. 290). As such, the “logical” remedy for language discrimination and extinction is to do nothing (Donskoi, 2006, p. 294). Suppose that we grant this claim about neutrality and inevitability of “natural” phenomena (which we should not), could seismologists equivalently argue that the only logical response to earthquakes is to do nothing? Or should a physician allow her patient to expire on account of the fundamentally natural basis of the progression of the patient’s viral infection? Importantly, this argument erroneously divorces macrolevel language phenomena from microrealities and fails to recognize that the functional valuation of any language is a political (thus ethical) act, as no language is inherently or naturally superior to another.

To summarize Part I, language planning theorists and their critics have contributed immensely to constructing affirmative views of multilingualism. Yet by deploying rigid criteria for rationality and social justice, they reify situationally convoluted and indeterminate communicative phenomena and social processes (B. Makoni & Makoni, 2010). To understand the discontinuities between the fixities of these debates and actual realities of language choices requires clarifying the operational terms of rationality and social justice. They hold that any valid theory of language planning must be rational, where rationality represents *ordered* social realities, *coherence* between theory and reality, and *generalizability* across relevant contexts. For instance, the claim that language is a “fundamental” and “inalienable” right represents an *ordered* reality that corresponds to a political theory of rights applicable to *all humans* as biologically and socially linguistic. Critics expose the disjuncture between the legal theory of right and the nature of language and demonstrate how the universality of rights (bearers can dispose of them as they wish) conflicts with the specificity of relevant contexts of language discrimination. Similarly, critics of resource insist that by appealing to all interests (minority protection and hegemonic control alike), language resource renders itself vacuous as a redress to specific phenomena of language discrimination. From an integrationist purview, the proclivity to segregate (aspects of) languages is both descriptively inaccurate and unfits these theories for the complicated task of defending linguistic diversity (S. B. Makoni, 2011)

PART II: SITUATIONALITY OF LANGUAGE PRACTICES: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA AND NIGERIA

The actual reality of multilingualism, marked by variations in origins, nature, and outcomes, abjures the logical fixities implicit in the debates outlined earlier (S. Makoni & Mashiri, 2007). This section uses evidence from my cross-national comparative ethnographic field study of education language policy (ELP) processes in multilingual societies to demonstrate that the conditions for and forces behind language decision making vary by context and are ridden with complexities, dilemmas, and paradoxes, such that ELP in these contexts defies unified/unitary rational theorization. Over a 5-month period starting in spring 2009, I used detailed semistructured interviews and observation to examine language policy activities of government and nongovernment actors, including national policy makers at ministries of education and national policy councils, university-based scholars, language activists, international organizations, local and international

nongovernmental organizations, and advocacy groups in India, Nigeria, and UNESCO's Paris headquarters.⁴ My analysis suggests that there is a disjuncture between the discourse on language hierarchy and the reality of plurilingualism and between the discourse on social justice and the politics of language policy making.

Disjuncture of Language Hierarchy and Plurilingualism

Informed by a spate of scholarship on multilingualism in India and Nigeria, my ethnographic study departed with the assumption that language hierarchies, which rank dominant and non-dominant languages along a continuum of social status, was pervasive in both countries (Ouane and Glanz, 2011; Annamalai, 2001; Austin, 2009; Bangbose, 2000; Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007; Mohanty, 2006). Dominant languages and their speakers enjoy economic, social, and political privileges denied less-dominant ones. However, ranking languages relies on a problematic discursive practice of individuating and counting languages as finite sociocognitive systems corresponding to (ethnic) communities of speakers with various comparable social markers (see S. Makoni & Mashiri, 2007 for a critique). Viewed through this lens, the linguistic cartographies of India and Nigeria are reducible to a patchwork of isolated monolingual communities with fixed, even if permeable, boundaries.

My observation is that Indians and Nigerians cannot be readily discrepated into discrete language groups. Of the 51 interviewees in this study, 94% (98% in India and 90% in Nigeria) has access to and identified socially with multiple native languages (see Table 1). Moreover, most of them view plurilingualism as the societal sociolinguistic norm in their respective communities. India's plurilingual polity results mostly from internal population mobility, such that down to the blocks, India is functionally multilingual in indigenous languages (Mohanty, 2006).⁵ In Nigeria, multilingualism in indigenous languages is more prevalent in densely populated urban areas and around language borders.

Although it is intuitive to talk about languages as separate systems, isolating languages in Indian and Nigerian cities requires one to ignore the ways they feature in actual communicative contexts. Individuals tend to use a mix of many indigenous, English, and urban "vernacular" varieties (Pidgin in Nigeria and Hindustani in India) in emergent colloquial forms that are fundamentally at odds with the formalized and textualized (à la autonomous text, see Grace,

⁴Participants represent the following institutions in India: Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD), National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT), University of Delhi, UNESCO Field Office, Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), ASER Pratham, all in Delhi; Central Institute of Indian Languages (CIIL) in Mysore; in Nigeria: Ministry of Education, National Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC), UNESCO Field Office, all in Abuja (and Lagos, for NERDC); University of Ibadan, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, University of Lagos, National Institute of Nigerian Languages (NINLAN), Babs Fafunwa Center for Yoruba Language Engineering (BAFCYLE) in Ibadan; and various independent language and education policy experts in both countries.

⁵The idea that "India" is multilingual helps to distinguish multilingualism from plurilingualism. *Multilingualism* denotes the presence and use of multiple languages within a society, while *plurilingualism* is the individual-level phenomenon of access to and use of multiple languages in fluid and constantly unfolding but deeply contextually embedded forms. For additional distinction of the two terms, see Byram and Parmenter (2012) and the Council of Europe's *Common European Framework of Reference for Languages* (2001).

TABLE 1
Linguistic Demography of Participants

Country	Participants' institution type	Number of participants	Average number of languages spoken	List of languages spoken
India	Central government language policymakers*	5	6	Hindi, Tamil, Punjabi, Kannada, Marathi, Bodo, Urdu, Gujarati, Telugu, Orija, Assamese, Kashmiri, Sindhi, Bengali, Bhojpuri, Chhattisgarhi, and English
	Universities**	4	7	Hindi, Tamil, Kashmiri, Punjabi, Dogri, Marathi, Gujarati, Telugu, Orija, Manipuri, Urdu, Assamese, Kashmiri, Sindhi, Bengali, Nepali, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarhi, Haryanvi, and English
	Language institutes***	2	7	Hindi, Tamil, Punjabi, Kashmiri, Kannada, Dogri, Manipuri, Malayalam, Marathi, Bodo, Urdu, Gujarati, Telugu, Orija, Assamese, Kashmiri, Sindhi, Bengali, Bhojpuri, Chhattisgarhi, Sanskrit, and English
	Local and international NGOs****	5	5	Hindi, Tamil, Kannada, Nepali, Marathi, Urdu, Gujarati, Telugu, Orija, Assamese, Kashmiri, Sindhi, Bengali, and English
Nigeria	Central government language policymakers*	5	3	Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, Efik, Igala, Edo, Idoma, Urhobo, Pidgin, English, and French
	Universities**	5	4	Yoruba, Igbo, Pidgin, English, and French
	Language Institutes***	2	5	Igbo, English, French, Pidgin, Efik, and Ibibio
	Local and international NGO****	3	3	Yoruba, Igbo, Pidgin, English, and Ibibio

*MHRD and NCERT in India, MoE and NERDC in Nigeria.

**University of Delhi in India, University of Ibadan, University of Lagos, and University of Nigeria, Nsukka in Nigeria.

***CIIL in India and NINLAN in Nigeria.

****ASER Pratham and SIL in India, BAFCYLE in Nigeria.

1987) forms encapsulated in formal language policies.⁶ Many Indian interviewees reminded me constantly that “nobody really speaks the Sanskritized Hindi, which is the official language; they all speak different forms of Hindustani and other languages” (personal communication, May 2, 2009). This gap between formalizing (i.e., fixing) linguistic codes and the actual indeterminacy of fluid linguistic practices represents a historicized moment of inventing language. S. B. Makoni (2011) argues provocatively that “in the beginning, there were no languages. . . . [and] the idea of language in African context is part of a process of invention . . . set in motion in colonial Africa” (p. 681). That is, the shift from an indeterminate use of linguistic practices and the primacy of communication to recent widespread individuation of languages as fixed “things” resulted from

⁶Nigerian Pidgin English receives marginal scholarly and no policy recognition, although it is spoken by nearly half of Nigeria’s estimated 170 million people (see Akande & Salami, 2010; Elugbe, 2004; Elugbe & Omamor, 1991; Faraclas, 1996). Hindustani is a mix of (or variety of mixtures of) Hindi and Urdu that serve as the lingua franca of urban New Delhi and most of northern India and Pakistan.

the colonial practice of naming, classifying, and cataloging people and cultural phenomena (S. Makoni & Mashiri, 2007). To catalog was to establish a fixed correspondence between a “language” and its “ethnic” speakers (the Igbo spoke Igbo, the Yoruba spoke Yoruba, the Zulu spoke Zulu), such that languanymy coincided with ethnonymy (S. Makoni & Mashiri, 2007). It is noteworthy that the names of languages and societies, including ethnicities, of colonized people were as much European coinages as postcolonial geopolitical maps. This colonial inventory helped and continues to help in facilitating the political management of colonized peoples.

While mainstream advocacy for linguistic diversity aptly documents that there exists throughout India (and to a lesser extent, Nigeria) an unbroken chain of functional multilingualism from one community to another, it adopts the language of this colonial inventorying (Mohanty, 2006; Pattanayak, 1984, 1990). It tells us that over 1.2 billion Indians speak about 452 “languages” compared to about 527 languages spoken by over 170 million Nigerians (Lewis, 2009). But this comparative enumeration is problematic because it seeks to articulate fluid language affiliations and plurilingual practices into neat “monolingual” structures that represent a mapping of society on an exclusively linguistic basis. Enumerating languages appears complicit with the colonial agenda of language hierarchies, which advocates of multilingualism seek to challenge. When I pressed an education professor at the University of Delhi on the palpable public anxiety over Hindi dominance, she queried: “When we talk about Hindi dominance; who are Hindi speakers anyway? I am from Tamil Nadu but I’m fluent in Hindi. My colleagues here are from non-Hindi areas but they all speak Hindi also” (personal communications, April 26, 2009).⁷ Languages do not always match an idealized isolated speaker community, although language hierarchies depend on enforcing a distinction of languages. In social practice, such distinction and the corresponding pervasive reality of language hierarchies are inconsistent with and uncondusive to the phenomena of emergent plurilingualism.

Certainly, this does not imply that one language is indistinguishable from another or that language classification is futile. (B. Makoni and Makoni [2010] suggest that it is only useful for what Foucault calls “governmentality.”) However, individuating languages is more a function of formal policy than actual linguistic practices. Put differently, formal language policies not only prescribe or proscribe languages and/or language behaviors within specified domains, they implicitly work to redefine the actual meaning and reconfigure the nature of language itself. An Indian professor of education, Anil Sadgopal, narrates an experience that illustrates the issue.

Over a decade ago, Professor Sadgopal organized a workshop on education in Dhubri, Assam, in northeastern India. As the workshop of about 60 young people started, Sadgopal, a Hindi speaker, requested for a Hindi-Assamese translator, since Assamese was the official language in Assam. About half an hour in, some workshop participants from the villages stood up in protest, indicating that they were unable to follow because, although they were from Assam, Assamese was not their primary language. Sadgopal soon identified that the workshop participants represented seven “languages” and arranged for translators across all languages. Although some Assamese speakers protested that this strategy would take too much time, he succeeded in persuading them about the priority of a more meaningful dialogue over saving time. As the weeklong

⁷As evident in the anti-Hindi agitations of the precolonial times and independence era, Tamil Nadu is often a symbol of resistance against Hindi dominance (see Anderson, 2013). A 2014 demand by the Home Ministry for bureaucrats to use Hindi (and English) on social networking sites sparked a new wave of such anti-Hindi reactions from Tamil Nadu (Sharma, 2014).

workshop proceeded, Sadgopal noticed that all participants, including those who protested against Assamese, actually understood Assamese quite well. Their earlier protest was in response both to nuances in their varieties of Assamese and what appeared to be a need to assert their native linguistic identities in the face of a political imposition by the regionally dominant Assamese and nationally dominant Hindi speakers. Having acknowledged their native varieties and now allowed direct expression in those varieties, the conversations gradually evolved to fluid intermixing of all languages by all participants throughout the workshop.

Besides the obvious point of asserting the fundamentally plurilingual character of the participants, Sadgopal's experience underscores the idea that any effort to codify language practices in "formal policy" (in this case, as the language of the workshop) invariably reifies complex and fluid communicative practices as finite individuated codes. As I navigated the large sprawling buildings of New Delhi's Shastri Bhavan, which houses various government ministries (including the Ministry of Human Resource Development [MHRD]), I frequently noted the disconnect between public signage and government documents (see Figure 1), which use multiple languages side by side as separate monolingual codes on one hand and the plurilingual practices of MHRD bureaucrats who tend to intermixed languages in fluid ways on the other. Thus, fixed monolingual codes are products of indeterminate plurilingual social practices. We can infer that, although education language policies (ELPs) attempt to specify the language of schooling, including language/media of instruction (L/MOI), textbooks, exams, and teacher education, its most potent effect is in the perdu reconfiguration of the nature of language in communicative contexts. The fecundity of ELPs in establishing linguistic social hierarchies entails an impulsion for both advocates and critics of multilingual education to embrace as normative the implicit isolated monolinguality of official text in fundamentally plurilingual social contexts. Thus, this strategy homogenizes and oversimplifies the linguistic diversity it defends.

Varieties of multilingualism. If the preceding discussion accurately represents linguistic phenomena in multilingual societies, our discourse on linguistic diversity needs to reconsider the unique histories of linguistic practices as integrated dimensions of larger sociocultural changes, which result in varieties (not homogeneity) of multilingualism. Having shared a common British colonial history, India and Nigeria have a similar overarching ELP framework, including the designation of English as official language, elevation of a select few languages to official status, and frequent language-related social conflicts. Beyond these structural similarities, both countries differ linguistically in many ways, especially in the ways language practices mediate ongoing ELP negotiations. Many experts suggest that India's history and contemporary politics have always had a linguistic character (Keay, 2010; Pattanayak, 1990; Sarangi, 2009) in a way different from Nigeria and other African countries (Adegbija, 2004; Adekunle, 1972; Aito, 2005; Bamgbose, 2000). These sources lay out the primordial role of linguistic practices in India prior to British colonialism as against the European colonial origins of present-day Nigerian multilingualism. Some of the well-known legacies of this variation in contemporary ELPs are worth noting.

As part of the independence movement, India redrew its political boundaries, starting in 1956, largely on the basis of language. This linguistic recartographication continued until 2000 with the addition of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand, thus emphasizing the enduring centrality of linguistic issues to India's postcolonial politics (Sarangi, 2009). Yet although all states are linguistically territorialized, not all languages are politically institutionalized to form a state. This results in a social hierarchy that feeds the discourse on linguistic discrimination. For example,



a. National Award to Teachers - 2013



b. "Run for Unity" at Maulana Azad National Urdu University, Hyderabad



c. MHRD 2012-2013 Annual Report (Ch. 16: Administration)

FIGURE 1 Official photos from MHRD reports and events.⁸

⁸See MHRD (2013) "Photo Gallery" and "Documents and Reports Web pages."

India's education language policy, the Three Language Formula (TLF), prescribes the following as L/MOI (a) mother tongue or regional languages; (b) Hindi in non-Hindi areas or any other (preferably southern) Indian language in Hindi areas; and (c) English or any other "modern" European language. The TLF permits only languages recognized in the Eighth Schedule (ES) of the Constitution but paradoxically proscribes ES languages not designated as regional languages, such as Urdu, Sindhi, and Sanskrit (Sarangi, 2009). Further, TLF increases the opportunity cost for linguistic minorities who must integrate into more language communities because theirs are not officially recognized (Sarangi, 2009). Both the constitution and TLF privilege English and Hindi over other Indian languages in correspondence with their respective speakers' social statuses. Hindi in the Devanagari script and English are the official national languages, with English to be gradually phased out 15 years after the 1950 constitution took effect. Yet English remains the de facto language of government, the public sector, and higher education.

In Nigeria, linguistic considerations were eventual contingencies of a fundamentally ethnic postindependence politics. Following the argument that the invention of language in Africa corresponded with the invention of ethnicity (see S. Makoni & Mashiri, 2007), it is arguable that linguistic considerations were contingent on the economic politics leading up to the eventual creation of Nigeria in 1914 by colonial Britain. Today, English retains the status of national language, with Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba (corresponding to the three dominant ethnicities) recognized as official Nigerian languages. French was later declared Nigeria's second official language due to politico-economic calculations of the then-ruling military junta (Aito, 2005). Accordingly, Nigeria's *National Policy on Education* (NPE) requires the use of Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba as L/MOI for the first 3 years of primary schooling and a switch to English subsequently (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004). Nigeria shares this policy of conscription of indigenous languages to lower levels of schooling and prescription of English in higher grades with India (Annamalai, 2001). Although this notion of transition from indigenous language to English reflects the sound principle that learning is maximal when it builds on a child's existing linguistic and cultural repertoires, its implicit endorsement of language hierarchy renders it problematic (Baker & Jones, 1998; García, 2009; Rhodes, Ochoa, & Ortiz, 2005). Importantly, centralized ELP makes no provisions about the more pervasive phenomenon of plurilingualism.

Compared to Nigeria, Indians are more likely to share a wider variety of linguistic identities (see Table 1). Most Nigerian ELP stakeholders are plurilingual in multiple native varieties, English, and Pidgin. As such, when Indians insist on using a specific language (say, Hindi) within a communicative context, it represents an explicit political defense of aforesaid relative social status of linguistic communities. In this context, it is not language or communicative needs but rather political negotiations that drive dynamic linguistic choices. In Nigeria, however, participants' plurilingual practices can be linguistically exclusive. The fluid use of varieties of Igbo, English, and Pidgin effectively excludes non-Igbo speakers. Four Indian bureaucrats independently corroborate the idea that it is unlikely for a few individuals at MHRD to hold a conversation in a language not understood by anyone present. A top language policy staff at MHRD explains that talks about language dominance are only indirect ways to assert preexisting social status, not an acknowledgement of existing linguistic barriers. Thus, an individual could address a group in English instead of Hindi, simply to take a political stance against Hindi dominance, not that the individual has no/inadequate access to Hindi.

However, I witnessed Nigerians use linguistic practices as boundary markers for inclusive and exclusive social groupings. This is clear in the following dialogue between a top policymaker at

the Ministry of Education in Abuja and another bureaucrat (both Igbo speakers but with marked dialectical variations):

Policymaker: So, when will I get that letter?

Bureaucrat: My boss [Oga mi], I'm still waiting for the Directors to finish their meeting.

Policymaker: Who is your "oga"? Isn't the ministry run by your people [Ọburọ unu n'achi anyị na ministryanụnwā]? Soon, your [Abakiliki-speaking] people will congregate and start speaking something no one understands [ihe mmadu anaghi aghota]. Just remember me when you people enter Aso Rock [suggesting that then Minister of Education, who is from Ebonyi State, has presidential ambitions; Abakiliki is the capital of Ebonyi State].

Bureaucrat: Let the Hausas get you [Ka ndi Hausa nwetakwa gi] . . .

Policymaker: Would they learn the Igbo language? [Igbo okwekaranu ha amuta?]

By identifying Abakiliki speakers and Hausas as exclusive language groups, while mixing various Igbo dialects, English, and Pidgin (e.g., *ministryanụnwā*), these bureaucrats point to the overlap between exclusive language blocs and plurilingual practices. Notably, the fact that both are Igbo speakers does not prevent one from using the Abakiliki variety to linguistically exclude another Igbo. Unlike India, language affiliations are therefore, not only political moves; they reflect actual linguistic barriers. Implicit in the reference to Abakiliki-speakers, native languages in such multilingual contexts serve as linguistic string binding social groups that negotiate other nonfixed social, political, and economic interests, including social status. Arguably, rational conceptualizations of language behavior need to seriously consider the contextual variability of individual and group choices within and across societies as well as through history.

Disjuncture of Social Justice and Politics of Language Policy

Applying the stringent criteria of order and coherence to all multilingual contexts is problematic because linguistic practices are characteristically situational, incoherent, and context laden. Territorialized linguistic differences make decentralization an administrative imperative of most multilingual societies, and invariably permits local detachment from artificial homogenizing efforts of central governments. From a social justice standpoint, the claims about rationality, evident in the rights and resource debates, suggest the possibility of remedying linguistic discrimination by formulating adequate policies that satisfy all or most legitimate interests. In reality, however, legitimate claims about the social justice of language interests are not neat and coherent. They reflect shifting and often-conflicting interests that require correspondingly shifting sets of ethical negotiations, which are not easily settled by theoretical calculus. For example, although various indigenous languages are used at all levels of schooling in India, some states/union territories (e.g., Arunchal Pradesh, Nagaland, Andaman/Nicobar Islands, etc.) adopt English as the official language (Jotwani, 2011). A centralized rationale for social justice that meets the interests of both indigenous language preservation and the protection of rights to choose English is problematic.

To clarify, language decision making in India and Nigeria reflects tensions between simultaneous demand for and resistance against both indigenous varieties of languages and English, as

English symbolizes both oppression and liberation. As a colonial legacy, English simultaneously elicits anticolonial resentments that fuel discourse about social self-determination and signifies liberation for “marginalized” groups, such as the Dalits (or “untouchable” class in India’s caste system). On April 30, 2010, Uttar Pradesh (India’s most populous state) erected a temple to a newly found “Dalit Goddess English,” inspired by the Statue of Liberty and standing on a computer, instead of the traditional lotus common in India’s religious cosmology. This is a religious and linguistic strategy to promote English as a resistance tool against Hindi hegemony. That this temple was inaugurated in honor of Lord Macaulay, the prime target of anti-English postcolonial nationalist politics (Evans, 2002) illustrates this tension. A top-level policy maker at India’s MHRD observes, “the same minorities . . . like Bodo, who fought for their language to be recognized in the constitution, started resisting it in schools in favor of English” (A. Prakash, personal communication, April 29, 2013). The struggles of the Bodo people (an ethnolinguistic community of Assam) for self-determination since the 1930s were essentially linguistic in nature. While their demands for self-governance continue to be ignored, the Indian government has progressively conceded them greater autonomy, including the recognition of the Bodo language in the ES. Several interviewees suggest that most Bodo people insist on English L/MOI in their schools, a move that appears to contradict their demand for Bodo recognition.

According to a Nigerian linguistics professor and national language policy consultant, “[linguistic groups] contradict themselves; they want their language for cultural and political identity but treat the same language as an economic liability; they want English for education and economic activities but despise its colonial ties” (personal communication, July 10, 2009). It is difficult to agree on a socially just solution to language interests of most minorities that leaves intact any notion of such a group as a cohesive entity. As critics of language rights indicate, part of the dilemma results from the tendency to view language groups as monolithic (see Brock-Utne, 2002; Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Djité, 2008; Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007). Subgroup differences abound, and language is hardly an exclusive unifying interest. Communities united by linguistic practices are often fractured by diverging social, political, cultural, and/or economic interests. Thus, focusing on language as such (e.g., language-as-right/resource, language competition, etc.) ignores the fact that language issues in multilingual societies often have little to do with language as with the history and relative statuses of corresponding communities (Edwards, 2003; Oakes, 2001).

An independent language activist and professor of linguistics in India argues that language has come to be a poster child for all kinds of political tensions and cultural conflicts. Obviously, these political issues are always changing, and stakeholders are constantly negotiating their own stances; sometimes they switch camps or change their positions, depending on what interests are at stake. So, language ends up being a convenient but unfortunate flag bearer for unstable political interests (personal communication, April 26, 2009).

Interviews with several language stakeholders across various levels of policy making in India and Nigeria echo this dual trap that confounds orderly and consistent demand on language decision making. Language practices are infused with larger political, socioeconomic, and cultural contingencies. Even the most organized claims about language inevitably face tension and conflicts when other political interests differ. To fit these conflicting demands and varied contingencies within a “rational” theory that satisfies all claims to social justice requires criteria beyond order, coherence, and universality. The incoherent interests that individuals and groups have in

language suggest that the appropriate redress to the injustice of language discrimination is not always a corresponding social justice.⁹

In follow-up interviews (summer 2011), a Nigerian professor of linguistics and leader of a Yoruba language advocacy group, highlights the problem of justice inherent in the relationship between language discrimination and the Nigerian legal system. He argues,

The Nigerian courts still convict people who do not speak English using laws written only in English and interpreted in English. How can you convict somebody using a law or language he doesn't understand? They can go to traditional Yoruba courts. But Yoruba traditional laws are not only different from Western laws; they are treated as inferior. (personal communication, June 2011)

In a postcolonial society with a mosaic of domestic and foreign sociopolitical cultures, institutional norms of justice are as diverse and antagonistic as the conflicting cultural forms and individual interests they represent. Justice in one cultural system can be unjust in another. To extrapolate a conceptual corollary, it is problematic to assume that if the aforementioned instrumentalist view conduces to unjust outcomes, the opposing constitutivist view must lead to just outcomes. But constitutivism and instrumentalism both overlap and clash; identity can be viewed as a nonlinguistic end (the instrumentalist case) and economic, political, and other ends can be seen as essential for identity along with language (the constitutivist case). A long-established import of metamessages in linguistics research is that even our conversational use of language serves the conflicting impulses for involvement and detachment (Tannen, 2013). We use language in conversations simultaneously to establish relationships with others and to assert our individuality from them. Correspondingly, the same orientation that mediates just outcomes inherently entails unjust ones, depending on what contingencies are foregrounded.

CONCLUSION

The preceding arguments need not signal a pessimistic withdrawal from the crucial task of redressing linguistic discrimination and language extinction. Nor do they imply that all theoretical orientations to and practical claims about language interest are equally justified (i.e., the notion that “anything goes”). Instead, they lend to at least two inferences. First, instead of holding all conceptual remedies for linguistic discrimination to uniform logical criteria, we could seek a pluralistic approach that allows for (a) a finite set of rationally justifiable and empirically feasible strategies, and (b) multiple configurations of social justice outcomes. That is, redressing language discrimination requires a robust conceptual toolkit with a finite number of orientations, not a single magic bullet. By implication, constructing and refining such orientations must be dialogic, tentative, and promote (not merely allow) the widest possibilities of language use that serve unique functions for shifting linguistic needs under varying contingencies. This represents the most justifiable conservative inference from the philosophical debates about and the empirical realities of linguistic practices in complex multilingual contexts. The neoliberal's do-nothingism is unjustified because on the one hand, one purpose of rational inquiry is to find justifiable interventions in nature, and language discrimination, extinction, and language-related inequities result from prejudicial actions of language-entangled actors with

⁹For a philosophical discussion of the antinomies of social justice, see Spragens (1993).

uneven political power. On the other hand, the fact of language decision making as political act does not legitimate linguisticism because there are currently no unproblematic conceptual grounds for upholding one/some language(s) and proscribing others. Specifically, to officially *permit* all languages (multilingualism) but deploy economic, social, and political incentives that favor only select languages is empirically equivalent to explicit policy proscription of those unincentivised languages. Thus, if we cannot avoid political interventions in language and have no justification for asymmetrical strategies toward different languages, educational theory, policy, and practice must tentatively encourage all languages while the dialogue continues about adequate treatment of language practices in multilingual contexts.

Policy makers may raise legitimate objections about the prohibitive costs of such an integrative model of MLB-MLE. Some MLB-MLE advocates consider this objection unjustified because applied linguistics have yet to provide a realistic cost estimate for bottom-up multilingual education policy and practice (Koffi, 2012). An Indian professor captures this sentiment when he argues that Indian politicians use claims about prohibitive cost to justify a lack of investment in the equitable advancement of linguistic diversity. During election seasons, however, the same politicians develop elaborate campaign materials in all languages of interest in an attempt to woo the electorate. While these criticisms are substantive, they do not appear to satisfactorily delegitimize concerns about the financial cost of language planning in multilingual societies, especially for cash-strapped multilingual nations who must invest in other urgent needs (e.g., health care and infrastructure). They also do not address prevailing economic and political dispensation. Thus, concerns about cost are relevant.

Yet if economists have yet to work out how actual financial costs (if any) are entailed, it is not logical to conclude that integrative multilingualism is too expensive for poor countries. Instead, it is rather reason to begin serious investigation that will help produce such cost estimates as well as discussions about what models of multilingualism and politico-economic ideologies are at work in the estimates. Such calculation will be more effective if it takes into account the possibility of evolving new economic, political, and social systems that are more inclusive of linguistic diversity. To clarify, a majority of the world's multilingual population abandons linguistic repertoires available to them because of economic, political, and social incentives to use other languages in specific domains. Fiscal concerns, therefore, should not merely address the cost of printing textbooks, educating teachers, and developing new software that fit current educational and social systems. They should also envision new models of education that take advantage of the inherently multilingual and plurilingual character of the world's populations, as well as their economic and social resources often ignored in the narrow structures of current social systems. To choose equitably among various linguistic options, an individual must have comparable incentives to pursue any and all linguistic choices.

Second, there is enormous need for continued empirical research to document changing conditions under which specific language practices yield measurable outcomes. For one, the agency of individual language users and the various forces that condition their language behaviors in an increasingly mobile and interconnected world are still poorly understood.¹⁰ Instead of merely postulating that individuals make informed rational economic choices (see Donskoi, 2006) or

¹⁰Maher's (2005) notion of "metroethnicity" is an example of the interpretations of these new forces of language behaviors.

uninformed ones (see Djité, 2008; Qorro, 2009) about domain-specific functional value of languages, we need more empirical documentations of microlevel language behaviors to understand patterns of prevailing social forces that drive language practices and corresponding institutional responses to those forces. Most accounts of institutional policy changes often ignore user agency. For instance, in her analysis of MLB-MLE policy changes in francophone Africa, Albaugh (2009) barely acknowledges the role of NGOs and local linguistics and credits these policy changes to the intellectual consensus and concerted political effort of distinguished French scholars. Theorizing language issues must depart from an assumption that local language users are savvy stakeholders entangled in complex webs of negotiations as their scholarly or politically affiliated counterparts. These inferences indicate the need for interdisciplinarity in language-related and relevant fields of scholarship (see De Schutter, 2007).

REFERENCES

- Adebija, E. E. (2004). *Multilingualism: A Nigerian case study*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Adekunle, M. A. (1972). Multilingualism and language function in Nigeria. *African Studies Review*, 15(2), 185–207.
- Ager, D. E. (1996). *Language policy in Britain and France: The processes of policy*. New York, NY: Cassell.
- Aito, E. (2005). National and official languages in Nigeria: Reflections on linguistic interference and the impact of language policy and politics on minority languages. In J. Cohen, K. T. McAlister, K. Rolstad, & J. MacSwan (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Bilingualism* (pp. 18–38). Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press.
- Akande, A. T., & Salami, L. O. (2010). Use and attitudes towards Nigerian Pidgin English among Nigerian university students. In R. M. Millar & R. M. Millar (Eds.), *Marginal dialects: Scotland, Ireland and beyond* (pp. 70–89). Aberdeen, Scotland: Forum for Research on the Languages of Scotland and Ireland.
- Albaugh, E. A. (2009). The colonial image reversed: Language preferences and policy outcomes in African education. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53, 389–420. doi:10.1111/isqu.2009.53.issue-2
- Anderson, L. D. (2013). *Federal solutions to ethnic problems: Accommodating diversity*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Annamalai, E. (2001). *Managing multilingualism in India: Political and linguistic manifestations*. New Delhi, India: Sage.
- Austin, G. (2009). Language and the constitution: The half-hearted compromise. In A. Sarangi (Ed.), *Language and politics in India* (pp. 41–92). New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.
- Baker, C., & Jones, S. P. (1998). *Encyclopedia of bilingualism and bilingual education*. Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters.
- Bamgbose, A. (2000). *Language and exclusion: The consequences of language policies in Africa*. Hamburg, Germany: Lit Verlag.
- Brock-Utne, B. (2002). Education and development: A developing theme. *International Review of Education*, 48(1/2), 45–61. doi:10.1023/A:1015650227543
- Brock-Utne, B. (2007). Learning through a familiar language versus learning through a foreign language—A look into some secondary school classrooms in Tanzania. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 27(5), 487–498. doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2006.10.004
- Brock-Utne, B., & Skattum, I. (2009). *Languages and education in Africa: A comparative and transdisciplinary analysis*. Oxford, England: Symposium Books.
- Byram, M., & Parmenter, L. (2012). *The common European framework of reference: The globalisation of language education policy*. Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters.
- Calvet, L.-J. (1998). *Language wars and linguistic politics*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Canagarajah, A. S. (1999). *Resisting linguistic imperialism in English teaching*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Canagarajah, S., & Ashraf, H. (2013). Multilingualism and education in South Asia: Resolving policy/practice dilemmas. *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*, 33, 258–285. doi:10.1017/S0267190513000068
- Cook, V. J. (1992). Evidence for multicompetence. *Language Learning*, 42(4), 557–591. doi:10.1111/lang.1992.42.issue-4

- Council of Europe. (2001). *Common European framework of reference for languages: Learning, teaching, assessment*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- De Schutter, H. (2007). Language policy and political philosophy: On the emerging linguistic justice debate. *Language Problems & Language Planning*, 31(1), 1–23. doi:10.1075/lplp.31.1
- Delany, C. F. (1994). *The liberalism-communitarianism debate: Liberty and community values*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Djité, P. G. (2008). *The sociolinguistics of development in Africa*. Tonawanda, NY: Multilingual Matters.
- Donskoi, V. (2006). Systemic theory of language competition. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 5(2), 277–298. doi:10.1075/jlp.5.2
- Dorian, N. (1993). A response to Ladefoged's other views of endangered languages. *Language*, 69, 575–579.
- Edwards, J. (2003). Language and the future: Choices and constraints. In H. Tonkin & T. Reagan (Eds.), *Language in the twenty-first century* (pp. 35–46). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.
- Elugbe, B., (2004). Nigerian Pidgin English: Phonology. In E. W. Schneider, K. Burridge, B. Kortmann, R. Mesthrie, C. Upton, E. W. Schneider, . . . C. Upton (Eds.), *A handbook of varieties of English* (pp. 813–830). Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Elugbe, B. O., & Omamor, A. P. (1991). *Nigerian Pidgin: Background and prospects*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria.
- Evans, S. (2002). Macaulay's minute revisited: Colonial language policy in nineteenth-century India. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 23(4), 260–281. doi:10.1080/01434630208666469
- Fafunwa, A. B., Macauley, J. I., & Sokoya, J. A. (Eds.) (1989). *Education in mother tongue: The Ife primary education research project (1970–1980)*. Ibadan, Nigeria: University of Ibadan Press.
- Faraclas, N. G. (1996). *Nigerian Pidgin*. London, England: Routledge.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2004). *National policy on education*. Lagos, Nigeria: NERDC.
- Fishman, J. A., Charles, F. A., & Das Gupta, J. (1968). *Language problems in developing nations*. New York, NY: John Wiley.
- García, O. (2009). *Bilingual education in the 21st century: A global perspective*. Malden, MA: John Wiley.
- Grace, G. W. (1987). *The linguistic construction of reality*. New York, NY: Croom Helm.
- Harmon, D. (1995). The status of the world's languages as reported in the "Ethnologue." *Southwest Journal of Linguistics*, 14(1&2), 1–28.
- Harmon, D. (1996). Losing species, losing languages: Connections between biological and linguistic diversity. *Southwest Journal of Linguistics*, 15, 89–108.
- Hobbes, T. (1651/1904). *Leviathan: Or, the matter, forme & power of a commonwealth, ecclesiasticall and civill*. A. R. Waller (Ed.). Cambridge, England: University of Cambridge Press.
- Hooper, P. (1998). Emergent grammar. In M. Tomasello & M. Tomasello (Ed.), *The new psychology of language* (pp. 155–175). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Hudson, W. E. (2008). *The libertarian illusion: Ideology, public policy and the assault on the common good*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Jessner, U. (2008). A DST model of multilingualism and the role of metalinguistic awareness. *The Modern Language Journal*, 92(2), 270–283. doi:10.1111/modl.2008.92.issue-2
- Johnson, D. C. (2013). *Language policy*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jotwani, N. (2011). *Report of the commissioner for linguist minorities (47th Report)*. Ministry of Minority Affairs, Government of India. Retrieved from <http://nclm.nic.in/shared/linkimages/NCLM47thReport.pdf>
- Kaplan, R. B., & Baldauf, R. B., Jr. (Eds.) (1997). *Language planning from practice to theory*. Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters.
- Kaplan, R. B., & Baldauf, R. B., Jr. (Eds.) (2007). *Language planning and policy in Africa: Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Tunisia*. Vol. II—Africa. New York, NY: Multilingual Matters.
- Karam, F. X. (1974). Toward a definition of language planning. In J. A. Fishman (Ed.), *Advances in language planning* (pp. 103–124). The Hague, The Netherlands: Mouton.
- Keay, J. (2010). *India: A history*. New York, NY: Grove Press.
- Klaus, D. (2003). The use of indigenous languages in early basic education in Papua New Guinea: A model for elsewhere? *Language and Education*, 17(2), 105–111. doi:10.1080/09500780308666842
- Kloss, H. (1969). *Research possibilities for group bilingualism. A report*. Quebec City, Quebec, Canada: International Center for Research on Bilingualism.

- Koffi, E. (2012). *Paradigm shift in language planning and policy: Game-theoretic solutions*. Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter.
- Kontra, M., Phillipson, R., Skutnabb-Kangas, T., & Várady, T. (Eds.) (1999). *Language, a right and a resource: Approaching linguistic human rights*. Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press.
- Kroll, J. F., & De Groot, A. M. (2005). *Handbook of bilingualism: Psycholinguistic approaches*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
- Kymlicka, W., & Patten, A. (Eds.) (2003). *Language rights and political theory*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Ladefoged, P. (1992). Another view of endangered languages. *Language*, 68(4), 809–811. doi:10.1353/lan.1992.0013
- Lewis, P. M. (2009). *Ethnologue: Languages of the world* (16th ed.). Dallas, TX: SIL International.
- Liddicoat, A. J., & Baldauf, R. B., Jr. (Eds.) (2008). *Language planning in local contexts*. Tonawanda, NY: Multilingual Matters.
- MacSwan, J. (2000). The threshold hypothesis, semilingualism, and other contributions to a deficit view of linguistic minorities. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 22(1), 3–45. doi:10.1177/0739986300221001
- Maffi, L. (2005). Linguistic, cultural, and biological diversity. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 34, 599–617. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.34.081804.120437
- Maher, J. C. (2005). Metroethnicity, language, and the principle of cool. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 2005(175–176), 83–102. doi:10.1515/ijsl.2005.2005.175-176.83
- Makoni, B., & Makoni, S. (2010). Multilingual discourses on wheels and public English in Africa: A case for “vague linguistique.” In J. Maybin, J. Swann, J. Maybin, & J. Swann (Eds.), *The Routledge companion to English language studies* (pp. 258–270). London, England: Routledge.
- Makoni, S., & Mashiri, P. (2007). Critical historiography: Does language planning in Africa need a construct of language as part of its theoretical apparatus? In S. Makoni, A. Pennycook, S. Makoni, & A. Pennycook (Eds.), *Disinventing and reconstituting languages* (pp. 62–89). Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters.
- Makoni, S. B. (2011). Sociolinguistics, colonial and postcolonial: An integrationist perspective. *Language Sciences*, 33, 680–688. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.020
- Marcía, R. F. (1979). Language choice and human rights in the United States. In J. E. Alatis (Ed.), *Georgetown University round table on languages and linguistics, 1979* (pp. 86–101). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- May, S. (2008). *Language and minority rights: Ethnicity, nationalism and the politics of language*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD). Government of India. (2013). “Photo Gallery” and “Documents & Reports” Retrieved from <http://mhrd.gov.in/gallery> and http://mhrd.gov.in/documents_reports
- Mohanty, A. (2006). Multilingualism of the unequals and predicaments of education in India: Mother tongue or other tongue. In O. García, T. Skutnabb-Kangas, & M. E. Torres-Guzmán (Eds.), *Imagining multilingual schools: Language in education and globalization* (pp. 262–283). New York, NY: Multilingual Matters.
- Neier, A. (2012). *The international human rights movement: A history*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Nekvapil, J. (2008). On language management in multilingual companies in the Czech Republic. In A. J. Liddicoat & R. B. Baldauf, Jr. (Eds.), *Language planning in local contexts* (pp. 268–287). Tonawanda, NY: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
- Oakes, L. (2001). *Language and national identity: Comparing France and Sweden*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.
- Ouane, A., & Glanz, C. (2011). Optimising learning, education and publishing in Africa: The language factor: A review and analysis of theory and practice in mother-tongue and bilingual education in sub-Saharan Africa. (A. Ouane, & C. Glanz, Eds.) Hamburg and Tunis Belvédère: UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning (UIL) and Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA).
- Pattanayak, D. P. (1990). *Multilingualism in India*. Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters.
- Pattanayak, D. P. (1984). Language policies in multilingual states. In A. Gonzalez (Ed.), *Pangani: Language planning, implementation and evaluation* (pp. 75–92). Manila: Linguistic Society of the Philippines.
- Patten, A. (2003). Liberal neutrality and language policy. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 31(4), 356–386. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2003.00356.x
- Pennycook, A. (2006). Postmodernism in language policy. In T. Ricento (Ed.), *An introduction to language policy: Theory and method* (pp. 60–76). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

- Petrovic, J. E. (2005). The conservative restoration and neoliberal defenses of bilingual education. *Language Policy*, 4, 395–416. doi:10.1007/s10993-005-2888-y
- Petrovic, J. E. (2011). The civics of language diversity: Human rights, citizenship and english-only. In J. L. DeVitis (Ed.), *Critical civic literacy: A reader* (pp. 393–404). New York, NY: Peter Lang.
- Phillipson, R. (1992). *Linguistic imperialism*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Phillipson, R. (2006). Language policy and linguistic imperialism. In T. Ricento (Ed.), *An introduction to language policy: Theory and method* (pp. 346–361). Malden, MA: Oxford University Press.
- Phillipson, R. (2013). *Linguistic imperialism continued*. Hyderabad, India: Orient Blackswan Private Ltd.
- Qorro, M. A. (2009). Parents' and policy makers' insistence on foreign languages as media of education in Africa: Restricting access to quality education—for whose benefit? In B. Brock-Utne & I. Skattum (Eds.), *Languages and education in Africa: A comparative and transdisciplinary analysis* (pp. 57–82). Oxford, England: Symposium Books.
- Rhodes, R. L., Ochoa, S. H., & Ortiz, S. O. (2005). *Assessing culturally and linguistically diverse students: A practical guide*. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
- Ricento, T. (2000a). Historical and theoretical perspectives in language policy and planning. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 4(2), 196–213. doi:10.1111/1467-9481.00111
- Ricento, T. (2000b). *Ideology, politics and language policies: Focus on English*. Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.
- Ricento, T. (2005). Problems with the “language-as-resource” discourse in the promotion of heritage languages in the U.S.A. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 9(3), 348–368. doi:10.1111/josl.2005.9.issue-3
- Ricento, T. (2006). *An introduction to language policy: Theory and method*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Rodríguez-Fornells, A., Balaguer, R. D., & Münte, T. F. (2006). Executive control in bilingual language processing. *Language Learning*, 56, 133–190. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9922.2006.00359.x
- Ruiz, R. (1984). Orientations in language planning. *Journal of the National Association of Bilingual Education*, 8(2), 15–34.
- Ruiz, R. (2010). Reorienting language-as-resource. In J. Petrovic (Ed.), *International perspectives on bilingual education: Policy, practice, and controversy* (pp. 155–172). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
- Sarangi, A. (2009). *Language and politics in india*. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.
- Sayers, D. (2009). *Reversing Babel: Declining linguistic diversity and the flawed attempts to protect it* (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Essex, Colchester, UK.
- Sayers, D. (2011). Language without rights: Book review. *The Linguist List*, 22(2311). Retrieved from <http://linguistlist.org/issues/22/22-2311.html>
- Schieffelin, B. B., Woolard, K. A., & Kroskrity, P. V. (1998). *Language ideologies : Practice and theory: practice and theory*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Sharma, A. (2014, June 17). Politics and nation. *The Economic Times*. Retrieved from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-06-17/news/50651316_1_home-ministry-prime-minister-narendra-modi-government-officials
- Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (2002). *Why should linguistic diversity be maintained and supported in Europe? Some arguments: Guide for the development of language education policies in Europe—from linguistic diversity to plurilingual education*. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe.
- Skutnabb-Kangas, T., Brutt-Griffler, J., Canagarajah, S., Pennycook, A., & Tollefson, J. W. (2004). The forum. *Journal of Language, Identity & Education*, 3(2), 127–160. doi:10.1207/s15327701jlie0302_3
- Skutnabb-Kangas, T., & Phillipson, R. (Eds.) (1995). *Linguistic human rights: Overcoming linguistic discrimination*. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter.
- Spragens, T. A., Jr. (1993). The antinomies of social justice. *The Review of Politics*, 55(2), 193–216.
- Stroud, C. (2001). African Mother-tongue programmes and the politics of language: Linguistic citizenship versus linguistic human rights. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 22(4), 339–355. doi:10.1080/01434630108666440
- Tannen, D. (2013). *That's not what I meant!: How conversational style makes or breaks relationships*. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
- Thompson, R. T. (1973). Language resources and the national interest. In K. R. Jankowsky (Ed.), *Georgetown University roundtable on language and linguistics, 1973* (pp. 225–231). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Tollefson, J. W. (1991). *Planning language, planning inequality: Language policy in the community*. New York, NY: Longman.
- Tollefson, J. W. (2006). Critical theory in language policy. In T. Ricento (Ed.), *An introduction to language policy: Theory and method* (pp. 42–59). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

- United Nations. (1948). *Universal declaration of human rights*. San Francisco, CA: Author.
- United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (1945). *UNESCO constitution*. London, UK: Author.
- United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (1953). *The use of vernacular languages in education*. Paris, France: Author.
- United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2003). *Education in a multilingual world*. Paris, France: Author.
- Wee, L. (2011). *Language without rights*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Wiley, T. G. (2006). Language planning and policy. In S. L. McKay & N. H. Hornberger (Eds.), *Sociolinguistics and language teaching* (pp. 103–147). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.